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The objective of this study is to examine the impact of concentrated ownership and business
group afﬁliation on the performance of Turkish ﬁrms during the ﬁnancial crisis by controlling
balance sheet currency exposure, international involvement and ﬁrm size. Our analysis
focuses on a 12-month window encapsulating the February 2001 ﬁnancial crisis. Our ﬁndings
show that balance sheet exposure is the key determinant of the ﬁrm performance during
the crisis periods. While we ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms with higher concentrated ownership
experience lower stock market performance prior and during the ﬁnancial crisis, business
group afﬁliation does not have any impact on the performance. However, there is weak
evidence that stock market performance increases with the level of business group
diversiﬁcation.
Keywords: Financial crisis, ﬁrm performance, exchange rate exposure, concentrated
ownership, business groups, group diversiﬁcation, emerging market
 
Introduction
 
ecent studies point to the signiﬁcance of
corporate governance in stock market
performance during ﬁnancial crises in emerg-
ing markets (Johnson 
 
et al
 
., 2000; Mitton, 2002;
Lemmon and Lins, 2003). Corporate gover-
nance is the protection of outside investors
against insider expropriation. Aggressive
expropriation both by managers and control-
ling shareholders is particularly important for
emerging markets, because emerging markets
typically suffer from low investor protection
practices. Particularly, when return expec-
tations lingered, insider expropriation in these
markets accelerates (Johnson 
 
et al
 
., 2000).
Therefore, consideration of corporate gover-
nance may provide additional insights in
investigations of stock return performance,
especially during a ﬁnancial crisis.
The objective of the current study is to
analyse the impact of a ﬁnancial crisis on the
exchange listed non-ﬁnancial Turkish ﬁrms.
The Turkish economy experienced a massive
R
 
currency crisis when its crawling peg regime
collapsed on 21 February 2001. Within the
course of two days, the Turkish Lira devalued
as much as 31 percent against the US dollar.
The currency crisis quickly spiralled into a
systemic ﬁnancial meltdown and the Turkish
economy contracted by 10 percent in 2001.
The prolonged recession dragged until the
economy recovered in 2003. This period pro-
vides the context for our study. We analyse the
impact of this large currency value depreci-
ation on the ﬁrm performance by focusing on
two dominant corporate governance factors;
fraction of shareholders, who have control on
management, and afﬁliation of ﬁrm with a
business group. In this analysis, we control
ﬁrm balance sheet currency exposure and
degree of international involvement as sig-
niﬁcant determinants of ﬁrm performance.
Unlike the conventional exposure studies,
we use two proxies for currency exposure:
Total exposure and debt exposure. Total expo-
sure is deﬁned as the ratio of net balance sheet
exposure (difference between the Turkish Lira
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(TL) value of foreign currency denominated
assets and liabilities) to total assets. The debt
exposure is deﬁned as the ratio of the TL value
of foreign currency denominated debt to total
debt. With such exposure measures, this study
focuses on a 12-month time window around
the February 2001 ﬁnancial crisis. We argue
that ﬁrm-speciﬁc operational, governance and
corporate structure characteristics contribute
to a better understanding of the impact of
the currency crises on the ﬁrm performance
in the emerging market context. Furthermore,
we expect that currency exposure proxies
employed in our analysis provide a superior
gauge for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc risks as compared
to operational exposure coefﬁcients.
Our results indicate a negative exposure for
the total balance sheet measure regardless of
the industry, export or import orientation. This
suggests that foreign currency denominated
liabilities on average exceed foreign currency
denominated assets. Consistent with previous
literature ﬁrst, we show that there are differ-
ences in ﬁrm performance during the Turkish
currency crisis. In particular, concentrated
ownership is associated with signiﬁcantly
poorer stock price performance. This is consis-
tent with Johnson 
 
et al
 
. (2000) and Lemmon
and Lins’ (2003) fund expropriation argument.
These authors suggest that the expected
amount of expropriation can be relatively
larger in countries where legal protection of
investors is lower when times are worse.
Second, our ﬁndings do not indicate a perfor-
mance difference between afﬁliated and non-
afﬁliated ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd weak evidence to
support the association between ﬁrm perfor-
mance and the degree of group diversiﬁcation
during the ﬁnancial crisis. For large ﬁrms,
ﬁrms with relatively higher export sales, rela-
tively smaller negative exposure and positive
total exposure, our study reveals larger excess
dollar returns prior to crisis and in the crisis
month.
The rest of this paper is organised as fol-
lows: in the next section we provide a brief
background on the Turkish currency crisis,
after which we evaluate the extant literature,
discuss the ﬁndings reported in related studies
and explore the currency exposure in the
Turkish context. We introduce our data and
methodology before discussing our empirical
ﬁndings. We conclude the paper with ﬁnal
remarks.
 
A brief review of the Turkish 
ﬁnancial crisis
 
When the Turkish government announced its
17th stabilisation programme in December
1999, approximately 14 months prior to the
February 2001 crisis, severely deteriorated
macroeconomic imbalances suggested that the
perceived political risk of maintaining the
status quo at the time was much higher as
compared to previous periods. In its stabili-
sation programme, the government was pro-
posing a comprehensive and far-reaching
economic programme which addressed Tur-
key’s many economic ills in the context of a
Stand by Agreement with IMF. The letter of
intent sent to the IMF on 9 December 1999
emphasised that the Turkish programme
rested on three pillars: up-front ﬁscal adjust-
ment, structural reforms and an exchange rate
commitment. Clearly, had the programme
achieved its objectives, it could invigorate the
Turkish economy.
The new programme started a ﬂurry of
actions by the ruling coalition. The govern-
ment diligently followed the reform agenda at
the outset. A set of tight ﬁscal and monetary
policies, the privatisation drive and a sched-
uled devaluation path for the Turkish Lira
helped to bring interest rates and inﬂation to
the lowest levels in years. However, during
the second half of 2000, the initial momentum
was lost. The decelerating reforms heightened
the concerns about the viability of the disin-
ﬂation programme and increased the market’s
sensitivity to bad news. The concerns further
escalated after the collapse of ten private
banks. The investigation of these banks under
the control of the newly established Banking
Regulation and Supervision Agency revealed
massive corruption. Naturally, the reports
aggravated the fear of a wider banking crisis.
The ensuing sell off of Turkish treasury bills
by foreign investors triggered a sudden capital
outﬂow and created a massive liquidity pres-
sure in the money markets. The Central Bank
stopped providing liquidity to the market to
avoid violation of the limits set by the Stand
by Agreement for the net domestic assets. The
increasing cost of overnight borrowing pro-
voked ﬁre sale of government bonds by one of
the commercial banks with a very risky bond
portfolio. Consequently, the bank was taken
under the control of the Banking Supervisory
Board on 5 December. The markets could only
be calmed after the announcement of a US$7.5
billion additional IMF credit. This was the ﬁrst
stress test for Turkey’s fragile disinﬂation
programme based on a crawling peg system.
In the aftermath of the crisis, interest rates
remained signiﬁcantly higher than the pre-
November 2000 levels.
The sustainability of the disinﬂation pro-
gramme with a crawling peg became increas-
ingly suspect as the Turkish Lira showed clear
signs of substantial real appreciation. In result,
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export growth declined dramatically. Market
scrutiny of the ailing attributes of the Turkish
economy heightened despite the swift injec-
tion of a large-scale IMF credit. In the midst of
all this adversity, Turkey tripped on its weak
peg when a political clash between the prime
minister and the president ignited a specula-
tive attack on the Lira. Shortly after the erup-
tion of the crisis, Central Bank abandoned the
crawling peg and ﬂoated the Turkish Lira.
This was the sign that, despite its “intellectu-
ally elegant” design with a built-in disintegra-
tion mechanism, the peg had failed. Turkey
became the ﬁfth high-proﬁle victim of a cur-
rency peg after Mexico, Thailand, Russia and
Brazil. The result was a huge cost on the Turk-
ish economy in terms of lost monetary credi-
bility, signiﬁcant balance sheet deterioration
and more importantly a very deep contraction.
 
Currency crises, corporate 
governance and exposure
 
A review of recent literature
 
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) point to severity of
currency crises in emerging markets in con-
trast to developed countries. Forbes (2002) and
Desai 
 
et al.
 
 (2003) show that ﬁrms with inter-
national activities are more affected by cur-
rency depreciations regardless of their origin.
Glen (2002) examines stock returns over a 2-
year window surrounding 24 currency deval-
uations in emerging markets. He concludes
that stock returns decline in the 6 months lead-
ing to the devaluation, but the returns follow-
ing the devaluation vary across countries and
ﬁrms depending on the ﬁrm, industry and
country characteristics. The study reveals the
signiﬁcance of country and industry effects, as
there is only limited support for the impact of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors. The conclusion about the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors may be inﬂuenced by the
use of only a small number of variables such
as size, liquidity and price/book value ratio.
The author recognises the limitation as he calls
for further research to explain the vast cross-
sectional variation observed in his sample.
A group of new studies focuses on the
impact of ﬁnancial crises on ﬁrm performance.
This strand of literature reveals that various
aspects of corporate governance may explain
cross-sectional variation observed in ﬁrm per-
formance. Johnson 
 
et al
 
. (2000) emphasise the
exacerbating effect of investors’ perception of
inappropriate expropriation during down-
ward economic cycles. This effect may be
stronger in emerging markets since in those
controlling shareholders are also managers.
Johnson 
 
et al
 
. provide a summary of alleged
incidents where controlling shareholders
might have unfairly expropriated value from
creditors and minority shareholders in Asian
countries. They then argue that weak enforce-
ment of shareholders right has the ﬁrst-order
importance as compared to standard macro-
economic variables in determining the extent
of exchange rate depreciation and stock
market collapse in the 1997–98 Asian Crisis.
Mitton (2002) draws attention to three
attributes of corporate governance (disclosure
quality, ownership structure and corporate
diversiﬁcation) and their inﬂuence on the
stock price performance of ﬁrms during the
crisis. Her ﬁndings indicate the effect of large
non-managing shareholders on superior stock
performance. In contrast, corporate diversiﬁ-
cation has an opposite effect on the stock price.
In her study the linkage between ownership
concentration and performance is mainly
attributed to prevention of expropriation in
the case of concentrated ownership. The nega-
tive effect of diversiﬁcation is attributed to
increasing information asymmetry in highly
diversiﬁed ﬁrms.
Similarly, Lemmon and Lins (2003) ﬁnd a
variation in ﬁrm performance based on differ-
ences in ownership structure during the East
Asian ﬁnancial crisis. In their view, the crisis
period represents a negative shock to the in-
vestment opportunities of ﬁrms. Accordingly,
in such periods there are more incentives for
controlling shareholders to expropriate from
minority shareholders. Also their study under-
lines the lower cumulative stock returns of
ﬁrms with pyramid ownership structures dur-
ing the crisis periods. Speciﬁcally they point to
a signiﬁcant return discount associated with
the insider-controlled ﬁrms in which managers
and their families detach the control and cash
ﬂow rights through pyramid structures. The
authors conclude that corporate ownership
structure plays an important role in determin-
ing the incentives of insiders to expropriate
from minority shareholders during times of
declining investment opportunities.
Baek 
 
et al
 
. (2004) examine the relationship
between corporate governance and ﬁrm value
during the Korean ﬁnancial crisis. They concur
on the effect of speciﬁc corporate governance
indicators and their effect on ﬁrm value. They
also report that ﬁrms with concentrated
ownership by afﬁliated ﬁrms experience a
larger decline in equity value. A similar effect
pertains to highly diversiﬁed ﬁrms with high
leverage, as well as small and risky ﬁrms.
 
1
 
 Kim
and Lee (2003) ﬁnd that ownership structure
signiﬁcantly explains performance of Korean
ﬁrms during the crisis, especially for Cheabol
ﬁrms.
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Currency exposure in the Turkish context
 
In this study, we analyse non-ﬁnancial compa-
nies listed in the Istanbul Stock Exchange
(ISE). As in many emerging market econo-
mies, the Turkish capital market displays the
characteristic of an infant market. Indeed, the
role of the equity markets in capital allocation
is rather limited.
 
2
 
 There is no active corporate
bond market.
 
3
 
 Chronic and extensive budget
deﬁcits compel governments to rely on bor-
rowing from the domestic debt markets
crowding out private borrowers from the
bond markets. On the equity side, listed shares
represent a relatively small portion of the
industrial base. Primary and secondary mar-
kets lack institutional investors. Secondary
markets suffer from thin trading as well as
inadequate disclosure. Such deﬁciencies limit
ﬁrms’ ability to obtain external ﬁnancing
while increasing reliance on retained earnings
and internal capital markets.
As in other emerging markets, minority
shareholder protection in the Turkish equity
markets is at best weak.
 
4
 
 Many listed ﬁrms
exhibit highly concentrated ownership struc-
tures. Such structures, as Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) point out, may be useful to alleviate
agency problems between the ﬁrm manage-
ment and outside investors. The shareholders
establish better monitoring mechanisms on
management and avoid many unfavourable
decisions. On the other hand, concentrated
ownership may lead to exploitation of minor-
ity shareholders. To investigate this conjecture,
La Porta 
 
et al
 
. (1998), with a sample of large
ﬁrms from 49 countries, study the correlation
between concentrated ownership and quality
of protection of investors. Their ﬁndings show
a strong negative correlation between the com-
bined stake of the three largest shareholders
and the quality of legal protection of investors.
In adverse external conditions, as is argued by
Johnson 
 
et al
 
. (2000) and Lemmon and Lins
(2003), the expected amount of expropriation
tends to be larger. Accordingly, the effect of
ﬁnancial crisis would be exacerbated for the
ﬁrms with a high percentage of concentrated
ownership.
In Turkey, the majority of the large ﬁrms are
organised as holding companies and they
operate in the form of business groups similar
to Korean Chaebols. Typically, holding com-
panies own a bank which serves, directly or
indirectly, as a major ﬁnancial source for the
member companies. This intertwined relation
often leads to the creation of a well-organised
internal capital market. By pooling their
funds, group ﬁrms can collectively ﬁnance
their short- and long-term capital require-
ments. These linkages facilitate access to capi-
tal for ﬁrms afﬁliated with a business group.
Plausibly this should reduce ﬁrm-level risk
because of availability of funds through inter-
nal markets. Especially when capital sources
dried out and interest rates surged, afﬁliated
ﬁrms are less likely to be affected from the
meltdown. In result, group afﬁliation allevi-
ates the impact of the ﬁnancial crises.
Chronic macroeconomic instability and per-
sistent high inﬂation in the Turkish economy
invariably create anomalies in the ﬁnancial
markets. Periodic overvaluation of the Turkish
Lira under a variety of exchange rate regimes
is a case in point.
 
5
 
 Additionally, large govern-
ment sector borrowing keeps real interest
rates consistently high and provides ﬁrms an
incentive to seek arbitrage opportunities
between domestic and foreign debt markets.
In fact, during the Turkish Lira overvaluation,
borrowing in foreign currency has been a
standard strategy for many Turkish ﬁnancial
institutions and businesses regardless of their
asset composition and revenue structures.
While the resultant capital inﬂows deteriorate
the domestic macroeconomic balances, the
same channel also initiates the correction pro-
cess. In several episodes, notably in 1994 and
2001, these corrections were sharp and highly
disruptive, sending the economy into a full
tailspin. Against such a macroeconomic back-
drop, it is plausible to suggest that balance
sheet exposure of the Turkish ﬁrms is critical
in analysis of the impact of sharp deprecia-
tions. An important consideration that cannot
be ignored in this context is the export and
import activities of the ﬁrms. While ﬁrms with
extensive export revenues in hard currencies
have a natural hedge against their foreign
currency denominated liabilities, ﬁrms with
signiﬁcant import bills face an increasing
exposure to exchange rate movements. In an
effort to differentiate the impact of deprecia-
tions/devaluations on the performance of
ﬁrms with and without natural hedges, we
take the import and export intensity of the
ﬁrms into consideration.
 
Data and methodology
 
In this study we analyse performance of 198
Turkish industrial ﬁrms listed in the ISE by
focusing on the 12-month period around the
February 2001 ﬁnancial crisis (from August
2000 to August 2001). The charts in Figure 1
provide a long-term visual on the movements
of nominal and real exchange rates and
selected stock market indices. The sharp
devaluation of the Turkish Lira and the impact
of the ﬁnancial crisis on the equity prices are
evident in the charts. Figure 1c also shows that
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there might be industrial differences for the
impact of ﬁnancial crisis.
We deliberately excluded ﬁnancial institu-
tions (banks, mutual funds, investment and
insurance companies) from the analysis be-
cause of their distinct ﬁnancial and oper-
ational characteristics. The majority of the
price and balance sheet data used in this study
is drawn from the ISE database. Financial
tables published by the ISE include detailed
footnotes. Our ﬁrm-level balance sheet foreign
currency exposure data were compiled from
these footnotes. The listed companies report
their foreign currency denominated assets and
liabilities in footnote 30 of the published ﬁnan-
cial statements.
 
Figure 1: This ﬁgure presents a longer-term view of: movements of nominal and real exchange rate (a),
of the stock market indices (b) and of some sector indices (c) to events surrounding devaluation event of
Turkish Lira in February 2001. All indices are normalized to 100 on the month of devaluation
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We use market index adjusted holding
period returns in US dollars for various hori-
zons as a performance proxy. For each ﬁrm-
adjusted holding period returns are calculated
by subtracting holding period returns of the
market index from the ﬁrm-speciﬁc holding
period returns:
(1)
where (T1, T2) is the holding period, Ri is the
return over the holding period in US dollars
for ﬁrm i, and Rm is the return for the
market index over the holding period in US
dollars.
Four alternative holding periods are used.
Ret(0, 0) is return in the crisis month, February
2001. Ret(−6, 0) is return 6 months prior to and
including the ﬁnancial crisis month. Ret(0, +6)
is the 6 months return following the crisis
(including the crisis month). Ret(−6, +6) is
return encompassing 12 months around the
crisis.
Q is the ratio of market value of assets to
book value of assets by two quarters prior to
and after March 2001.
(2)
We also measure Q for three alternative peri-
ods. 
 
Q
 
(0, 0) is for the ﬁnancial crisis month.
Since monthly balance sheet information is
not available, we have to rely on quarterly
information. Therefore 
 
Q
 
(0, 0) is calculated by
using market and book value of assets at the
end of March 2001, which is around one
month later than the ﬁnancial crisis month.
 
Q
 
(
 
−
 
6, 0) and Q(0, 6) are calculated two quar-
ters prior to and after March 2001.
We use two measures of balance sheet
exchange rate exposure: (i) Total exposure
is measured as the ratio of the difference
between TL value of foreign currency denomi-
nated assets and TL value of foreign currency
denominated liabilities to total assets at the
end of the year 2000, which is the ﬁscal year
end prior to the ﬁnancial crisis month:
(3)
where FA is the TL value of foreign currency
denominated assets, FL is the TL value of for-
eign currency denominated liabilities and TA
is TL value of total assets.
(ii) Debt exposure is measured as the ratio
of TL value of foreign currency denominated
liabilities to total debt at the end of the year
2000.
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i
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, ,
,
i
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=
−
(4)
Our empirical strategy is focused on the
impact of percentage of shares held by control-
ling shareholders (concentrated ownership)
and business group afﬁliation on the ﬁrm per-
formance during and around the crisis period.
However, ﬁrst we conduct a range of differ-
ences in mean (median) values of performance
and exposure variables to gain insight about
the sample characteristics. The mean (median)
values of selected variables were compared
and the signiﬁcance tests conducted by using
t (chi-square) statistics. In the second stage of
our analysis we use a multivariate regression
model to identify the determinants of cross-
ﬁrms performance during crisis. Our multi-
variate regression model is stated below:
Afﬁliation dummy is used to classify ﬁrms
depending on their connection with a business
group (the value 1 designates afﬁliation with
a business group). We use the ratio of export
sales to total net sales and the ratio of import
costs to total cost of goods sold as proxies for
the extent and nature of international involve-
ment of the ﬁrms. Natural logarithm of total
assets at the end of the year 2000 controls the
size of ﬁrms. Concentrated ownership is meas-
ured as the percentage of shares held by the
largest three shareholders at the end of 2000.
Dummies for major industries (the names of
these industries are listed in Table 1) are used
to control the industry effects.
Empirical ﬁndings
The role of total exposure
In Table 1, we report sample descriptive
statistics by industry including number of
observations, the percentage of concentrated
ownership, mean balance sheet exposures
(total and debt exposures), asset size, export
and import ratios, holding period returns, and
shares. The shares denote the percentage of the
total ﬁrm shares actively traded on the market.
DEXPi
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The ﬁndings reported in Table 1 suggest that
50 percent of ﬁrms’ equity, on average, is held
by three owners who have the largest percen-
tage of shares. This does not change across
industries, except transportation and commu-
nication industry. All industries on average
exhibit negative balance sheet exchange rate
exposures. Included in the list of higher
balance sheet exposure are food/beverages/
tobacco, textile/clothing/leather, chemicals/
petroleum/rubber/plastic, material construc-
tion. Interestingly, export-oriented sectors
such as textile and material construction have
the highest negative exposures. An ad hoc
explanation for this ﬁnding is that these com-
panies may prefer to borrow in hard foreign
currencies to ﬁnance their export sales par-
ticularly during Turkish Lira overvaluation.
Ex ante, these liabilities are expected to be
covered with export sales denominated in
hard currencies, and provide a natural hedge
for the ﬁrm. Hence, exporting ﬁrm’s foreign
currency debt preference is intuitive, particu-
larly during the high real interest periods in
the local debt markets.6
Mean returns in February 2001 and average
holding returns for 6 month prior to the crisis
are negative and range from −12 percent to
−41 percent. A casual look at the average in-
dustry holding period returns suggests notable
differences across industries. This observation
requires veriﬁcation, but it also suggests that
we have to control for industry effects.
In general, export-oriented companies are
expected to beneﬁt from depreciation of their
home country currencies.7 In contrast, import-
ing companies beneﬁt from the appreciation of
their home currencies. Also exporters with
larger foreign currency denominated debt
than their foreign currency denominated
assets (negative total exposure) beneﬁt from
an appreciation of the home currency. At the
same time they face increasing debt service
costs in the wake of a depreciation, which
may not be offset by the increasing export
revenues. Hence, we argue that balance sheet
exchange rate exposure is more important
than the form and international activities of
the ﬁrms in determining the exchange rate
risk. We develop our analysis to control
balance sheet currency exposure in the ex-
amination of how ﬁrms with varying corpo-
rate governance characteristics are affected
from the ﬁnancial crisis.
Corporate governance and comparative 
performance analysis
In Table 2, we present a summary of mean
values of stock performance (holding period
returns and the Q ratio) for the sample and for
two different classiﬁcations. First, the mean
(median) value of stock returns (Ret00) for the
sample ﬁrms is −0.19 (−0.20) in the crisis
month. Six months before the crisis (RetM6),
the mean (median) stock return is −0.34
(−0.38). Six months after the crisis, returns go
up even though the large negative returns dur-
ing the crisis month are included. The mean
(median) value of stock returns for a 12-month
window is negative. The mean and median
values of the Q ratio have a decreasing trend
from prior to until after the ﬁnancial crisis. The
mean (median) value of Q decreases from 2.39
(1.87) to 1.56 (1.28) with the ﬁnancial crisis.
The comparative analyses of performance
based on group afﬁliation and diversiﬁcation
are reported on Panel A. In this panel, we clas-
sify afﬁliated ﬁrms by the extent of diversiﬁ-
cation based on the 2-digit SIC codes assigned
to the ﬁrms. If the afﬁliated ﬁrms happen to be
operating in two or less distinct industries,
they are included in group 1 (labelled as
Diversiﬁed 1) and in more than two distinct
industries they are included in group 2
(labelled Diversiﬁed 2). Our ﬁndings reported
in Panel A suggest that non-afﬁliated ﬁrms
have a signiﬁcantly higher export-sales ratio
than the afﬁliated ﬁrms. This is valid even
though they have a similar import cost ratio
and total exposures. The differences in Q and
stock returns between these two groups are
not statistically signiﬁcant. This result indi-
cates that, contrary to our expectations, non-
afﬁliated ﬁrms with a higher export-sales ratio
did not beneﬁt from the depreciation of the
home currency.
We examine the extent of diversiﬁcation for
afﬁliated ﬁrms in order to explore the impact
of the group structure in the wake of a cur-
rency crisis. Our ﬁndings show that ﬁrms in
the more diversiﬁed group 2 (Diversiﬁed 2)
have a lower mean value of negative total
exposure than ﬁrms in the less diversiﬁed
group 1 (Diversiﬁed 1). Also these ﬁrms have
a lower export-sales ratio than non-afﬁliated
ﬁrms. In the month of ﬁnancial crisis, afﬁliated
ﬁrms in group 2 are less affected than both
afﬁliated ﬁrms in the group 1 and non-
afﬁliated ﬁrms. Moreover, they have higher
positive stock market returns 6 months after
the crisis month. However, at the end of the
12-month period, the return differences are not
statistically signiﬁcant. On the other hand, Q
ratios of afﬁliated ﬁrms differ when they are
separated by the extent of diversiﬁcation. The
more diversiﬁed group 2 ﬁrms have a lower
mean Q ratio than the less diversiﬁed group 1
ﬁrms. Although this result may seem to con-
tradict the results obtained for the returns, it
can be attributed to the higher negative total
exposure of the group 1 ﬁrms. This group
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performed better than the group 2 ﬁrms dur-
ing the overvaluation of the Turkish Lira prior
to ﬁnancial crisis, but was hit hard after the
crisis. While the Q ratio sharply declined from
2.88 to 1.73 for the less diversiﬁed group 1, it
declined more moderately from 1.92 to 1.38 for
the more diversiﬁed group 2. Despite the
sharp decline in the Q ratio of group 1, this
group still has a higher average Q ratio than
the more diversiﬁed group 2.
On Panel B of Table 2, results are presented
based on the ownership concentration. Based
on the percentage of shares held by controlling
shareholders, the sample is divided into four
quartiles.8 Even though there are no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant differences in total exposure
and the international involvements of ﬁrms
among these four groups, ﬁrms with a lower
percentage of concentrated ownership in the
ﬁrst and second quartiles have lower negative
stock market returns in the 6 months prior to
the crisis including the event month than the
ﬁrms in the third and fourth quartiles. This
result suggests that the concentrated owner-
ship may be a performance determinant prior
to and during the crisis period in addition to
the total balance sheet exchange rate exposure.
In an effort to explore the impact of the
exposure on the performance we classify our
ﬁrms into high and low exposure groups
around the median exposure. Similarly, in
order to capture the impact of the international
involvement, we classify our sample ﬁrms into
two categories as “international” and “domes-
tic”. Finally we check the impact of the ﬁrm
size on the performance by grouping the ﬁrms
around the median size. We report our ﬁnd-
ings in Table 3. A comparative analysis of the
mean value of stock returns suggests that
there are signiﬁcant performance differences
among these groups prior to the crisis and
during the crisis month.
The results for comparison based on the
total exposure (Panel A) indicate that ﬁrms
with high exposure9 have smaller negative
returns than ﬁrms with low exposure 6
months prior to and in the crisis month. We
observe the same results for all four periods
for the median return. We also ﬁnd that large
ﬁrms (Panel B) perform better than small ﬁrms
prior to (according to median returns) and
during the crisis month (according to both
mean and median returns). We have not iden-
tiﬁed any signiﬁcant impact of debt exposure
(Panel C), the international activities meas-
ured by both export-sales (international ﬁrms
versus domestic ﬁrms: Panel D) and import
cost ratios (importing versus non-importing
ﬁrms: Panel E). For the combination of inter-
national activities and total exposure, we ﬁnd
that domestic ﬁrms with more negative total
exposure are affected more during the crisis
month (Panel F).10 We observe similar results
for non-importing ﬁrms with more negative
total exposure (Panel G).
Comparative analysis of Q ratios indicates
that ﬁrms with lower debt exposure and
higher total exposure (less negative or posi-
tive) have a higher Q 6 months prior to the
crisis month. However, this is reversed 6
months after crisis month. This can be largely
attributed to the increasing cash outﬂows in
the aftermath of the crisis due to higher TL
cost of servicing foreign currency denomi-
nated debt. This reduction of debt values in
their balance sheet may reduce dramatically
their book value of assets relative to market
value. The Q ratios of both international and
importing ﬁrms are also lower relative to their
comparison pairs.
Results from multivariate results
In this section, we focus on the results from
multivariate regression analysis that deter-
mine factors having an impact on the ﬁrm
performance around the crisis. We use several
periods for performance, namely adjusted US
dollar returns during the crisis month, 6
months prior to and following the crisis. While
we are mainly interested in exploring the
explanatory power of concentrated ownership
and level of group diversiﬁcation, we control
for the exposure, international activity, size
and industry. We use four alternative speciﬁ-
cations. In model [1] an afﬁliation dummy is
included but industry effect is not controlled.
In model [2] industry effect is controlled with
the introduction of dummy variables for major
industries reported in Table 1. Model [3] intro-
duces dummy variables in order to control the
diversiﬁcation level and the impact of group
afﬁliation. Finally, in Model [4], we use two
dummy variables to explore the impact of
group diversiﬁcation of afﬁliated ﬁrms as we
exclude the dummy variable to differentiate
the afﬁliated and non-afﬁliated ﬁrms.
Our multivariate regression results are
reported in Table 4. Dollar stock return during
the crisis month is the dependent variable in
Panel A. The estimated coefﬁcient for the Con-
centrated Ownership is negative and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding indicates that
ﬁrms with higher percentage of shares held by
large shareholders experience steeper negative
stock returns. Group afﬁliation and group
diversiﬁcation don’t have any impact on the
stock returns. The coefﬁcient of variables Total
Exposure and Export-Sales Ratio are positive
and statistically signiﬁcant at 1 percent level
in all four regression models. This result
suggests that ﬁrms with lower negative or
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positive exposures or ﬁrms with higher ex-
ports have higher stock returns (less negative)
in the crisis month. We also observe that debt
exposure does not have any effects on stock
returns by itself. We interpret the evidence on
total exposure and debt exposure together,
since exchange rate risk at ﬁrm level depends
on the combination of assets and liabilities.
The positive sign observed in the variable Size
suggests that decline in value is larger for
small ﬁrms than for large ﬁrms.
In Panel B, return 6 months prior to crisis is
the dependent variable. Our results reported
here are similar to results in Panel A with the
exception of Export-Sales Ratio. However,
signiﬁcance levels are lower in this case. The
ﬁrms with a higher export-sales ratio don’t
have signiﬁcantly different returns than the
ﬁrms with lower export-sales ratio during
this period. The estimated coefﬁcient of the
dummy variable for the less diversiﬁed busi-
ness group ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly positive in
the regression Model 4. Since this group of
ﬁrms has higher negative total exposures,
they experience higher stock returns before
the crisis when TL is overvalued. The results
for the adjusted holding period return 6
months following the crisis (Panel C) indicate
that ﬁrms with higher exports have higher
stock returns after sharp devaluations. More-
over, stock returns at this period are higher for
more diversiﬁed business group ﬁrms (Diver-
siﬁed 2). The estimated coefﬁcients of this
variable are positive at both Models 3 and 4.
Total exposure and Concentrated Ownership
don’t have any impact on the results for this
period.
Concluding remarks
In this article, we analyse the impact of con-
centrated ownership and group afﬁliation on
the performance of 198 Turkish industrial
ﬁrms in adversity. The study focuses on and
around the 2001 ﬁnancial crisis. Our analysis
controls for ﬁrm-speciﬁc currency exposure,
international activities, and size. We measure
the ﬁrm-level foreign exchange rate exposure
by using an accounting measure, namely
balance sheet exchange rate exposure. This
measure is a more robust risk measure than
the ones used in the related literature.
We show that stock returns 6 months prior
to and during ﬁnancial crisis decrease dra-
matically, but after crisis period returns are
recovered. Our results provide evidence
that ownership concentration is the main de-
terminant of the ﬁrm value during a crisis
period along with the balance sheet exposure,
size and export-sales ratio. Concentrated
ownership is associated with signiﬁcantly
lower return performance, especially prior to
and during ﬁnancial crisis. This is the period
investors are disappointed by lower returns.
Lower returns trigger an excessive expropria-
tion activity by controlling shareholders. We
observe that the adjusted returns are posi-
tively associated with total exposure, ﬁrm size
and export-sales ratio. While business group
afﬁliation does not seem to have any effect on
returns, the ﬁndings provide weak evidence
for a positive association between the group
diversiﬁcation and performance.
Notes
1. They also measure ﬁrm risk with Beta which is
obtained from the market model regression
performed with one year daily stock returns
during the 1996 period.
2. The size of the primary markets is very
small compared with peers and developed
economies.
3. Persistent budget deﬁcits in the Turkish
economy created an insatiable desire for funds
and crowded out private ﬁrms from the bond
market.
4. This is evident in many high proﬁle expropri-
ations in the 1990s by insiders or majority con-
trolling shareholders, e.g. Metas and Cukurova
Electric. It is also veriﬁed by the scores and
rankings attributed to Turkey in La Porta et al.
(1998).
5. T.C. Central bank reports monthly real
exchange rate index normalised in the year
1995. The overvaluation of Turkis Lira can
easily be observed by examining this index
(http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html).
6. However, these ﬁrms may not be able generate
sufﬁcient export sales (foreign currency cash
ﬂows) during the crisis period and in its after-
math partly because of deteriorating supply
conditions, and disruptions in the domestic
credit markets. These factors may have a nega-
tive impact on their performance.
7. It is possible that hedging losses incurred
during the devaluation period may offset
otherwise possible windfall gains from ex-
ports. However, most widely available hedg-
ing tools are short-term in nature, and unless
the ﬁrm engages in operational hedges, the
impact of these losses on the ﬁrm value may
be limited.
8. All ﬁrms in the sample were divided into four
quartiles based on the level of concentration:
0–32, 32–50, 50–64, >64 percent.
9. High exposure means total exposure above the
median, less negative or positive.
10. More negative means a larger difference
between the TL value of the foreign currency
denominated debt and the TL value of foreign
currency denominated assets.
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